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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiff in this case is the State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Board. The Idaho 
Transportation Board is composed of citizen members appointed by the Governor. It serves as 
the policy-making body of the Idaho Transportation Department ("lTD"). Except where 
otherwise noted, the Plaintiff shall be referred to as "lTD." 
lTD filed this action to condemn a portion of real property owned by Defendant-
Appellant HJ Grathol, a California limited partnership ("Grathol"). The condemned property is 
needed as part of the lTD project to widen and improve U.S. Highway 95 ("US-95") between the 
communities of Garwood and Sagle in north Idaho. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-721, lTD moved for possession of the condemned property 
prj or to trial. The district court granted lTD's motion following an evidentiary hearing and 
finding that the four statutory requirements for possession under § 7-721 were met. Grathol has 
appealed the district court order granting possession. 
Grathol makes two arguments on appeal: (1) that the Director of lTD cannot authorize 
and execute an administrative order of condemnation by the Idaho Transportation Department; 
and (2) that lTD is condemning more property than identified in lTD's Complaint. 
This appeal has no basis in law or fact and should be denied on the following grounds. 
First, the Director of lTD has both statutory and administrative authority to authorize and 
execute an administrative order of condemnation on behalf ofITD. Second, lTD is not 
condemning any property other than the property identified in its Complaint. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. May the Director of the Idaho Transportation Department, as the technical and 
administrative officer of the Idaho Transportation Board, authorize and execute administrative 
orders of condemnation on behalf of the Idaho Transportation Department. 
2. Is lTD condemning property from Grathol other than the property identified in 
lTD's Complaint. 
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3. lTD requests that it be granted its attorney fees on appeal under I.e. § 12-121. 
The appeal has no basis in law or fact, and would require the Court to disregard numerous 
statutes which directly contradict Grathol's appeal. In addition, none of the issues stated by 
Grathol are the proper subject of an interlocutory appeal under I.e. § 7-721 or Rule 54(b), the 
issues stated are not consistent with the Rule 54(b) application by Grathol and the Rule 54(b) 
certification by the district court. Therefore, attorney fees should by awarded to ITD under I.e. 
§ 12-121. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Idaho Transportation Board. 
The Idaho Transportation Board is a citizen board whose members are appointed by the 
Governor. I.C. § 40-302. The Idaho Transportation Department is divided into six districts. I.e. 
§ 40-303. One Board member is appointed from each of the six districts, and a seventh, at-large 
member, is appointed to serve as chairman. !d. 
The Board is the policy-making body of the Idaho Transportation Department. It meets 
twelve (12) times per year, generally once per month. I.C. § 40-308. Its primary function is to 
decide what state highway projects will be built, when, and in what order of priority. I.e. § 40-
310. State highway projects include both construction of new state highways, reconstruction and 
improvement of existing highways, and major maintenance projects on existing highways. The 
decisions of the Board are based on recommendations from the District Engineer of each of 
ITD's six districts, with input from other state agencies, city and county governments, business 
interests, and private individuals. 
B. The lTD Project. 
The Idaho Transportation Department is engaged in a project to widen and improve a 
section ofUS-95 between the communities of Garwood and Sagle in north Idaho ("the Project"). 
In 2002, lTD initiated a comprehensive study ofUS-95 between Garwood and Sagle. R. at 157, 
~ 4 (Minzghor Aff., ~ 4). The study determined that US-95 should be redesigned and expanded 
to improve public safety and enable the highway to accommodate increasing traffic volumes. Id. 
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Due to the size of the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project, it has been divided into seven 
segments. R. at 158, ~ 6. The Grathol property is located in the "Athol Segment" of the Project, 
ITD Project No. A009(791), Key No. 9791. Jd. The Athol Segment will convert approximately 
1.8 miles ofUS-95 from a two-lane, Type III access highway to a four-lane divided and access-
controlled highway. R. at 158, ~ 7. The Athol Segment will also construct an interchange with 
Highway 54 just outside of the town of Athol. Jd. 
C. The Grathol Property. 
The Grathol property is located in Kootenai County, outside the town of Athol, at the 
northeast comer of present US-95 and Highway 54. Before the Project, the total area of the 
Grathol property was 56.81 acres. The property condemned, shown in Exhibit B to the 
Complaint (see R. at 11) is 16.314 acres, leaving Grathol with 40.496 acres after the taking. 
A metes and bounds legal description ofthe 16.314 acres condemned in the Complaint is 
attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. R. at 7-9. 
The construction plan sheets for the US-95 Project specific to the Grathol property are 
attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint. R. at 11-15. These plan sheets identify and define the 
taking on the Grathol property and the US-95 highway improvements to be constructed on the 
Grathol property. These plan sheets also identify and define the property proposed for 
condemnation in the administrative order of condemnation. R. at 16, ~~ 2, 3 (admin. ord. of 
condemn., at 1, ~~ 2, 3). 
The following is an enlarged view ofthe primary construction plan sheet contained 
in Exhibit B of the Complaint. It shows the Grathol property outlined in green, with the 
condemned property shaded in yellow. It also shows the construction that will occur on the 
condemned property in the area shaded in yellow. 
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Below the area shaded in yellow is the location where Sylvan Road would have been 
constructed by ITD if Grathol had agreed to dedicate the land for that purpose. The diagram also 
shows Roberts Road to the right (north) of the Grathol property and the connection of Roberts 
Road with Williams Lane (far right), which provides the additional access to the road system 
sought and obtained by Grathol's neighbors to the north. 
Both the administrative order of condemnation and the Complaint use the construction 
plans to identify and define the property to be condemned from Grathol. As the construction 
plans plainly show, ITD is not condemning any of the Grathol property for construction of 
Sylvan Road. The only property being condemned is shown in yellow and the only 
improvements being constructed is the new US-95, also shown in yellow. By admitting that the 
Complaint does not condemn any property for Sylvan Road (Appellant Br. , at 31), Grathol 
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admits that the administrative order also did not identify any land to be condemned for Sylvan 
Road. 
D. The Idaho Transportation Board Approved The US-95 Project. 
The Idaho Transportation Board repeatedly approved the US-95 Project. R. at 166-167, 
~~ 6, 9-12 (Vogt Aff., ~~ 6, 9-12). The Board approves state highway projects (construction of 
new highways, reconstruction and improvement of existing highways, and major maintenance 
projects) through adoption of the annual Idaho "Statewide Transportation Improvement 
Program" ("STIP"). R. at 155, ~ 10. 
Grathol mischaracterizes the STIP program as a "funding mechanism." In fact, the STIP 
program is an exhaustive, year-long process culminating in the selection and approval of state 
highway projects by the Idaho Transportation Board. The process includes public hearings by 
the Board and the solicitation of public comment from state and local governments, business 
interests, and private individuals. It is the process through which the Idaho Transportation Board 
decides which projects will be built, when, and in what order. In addition, prior to adoption of 
the STIP each year, the Board affirms that all federal requirements for public involvement and 
comment have been met. See, e.g., R. at 191. 
Every year, after months of preparation, public hearings, and public comment, the Board 
approves a STIP. This decision constitutes the Board's formal decision on and approval of the 
state highway projects that are to be undertaken for the next five years. R. at 167, ~ 11. An 
approved project is generally included in the STIP for five years, marking its progress from 
design and determination of route, to right-of-way acquisition, through construction and 
completion. The US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project has been approved by the Board in each 
annual STIP since 2005. R. at 166-170. See also R. at 175-260 (Vogt Aff., Exs. 2-11) (Board 
approvals and adoptions of annual STIPs for fiscal years 2005-2010). 
Idaho law requires the Board to hold public hearings before making its final decision on 
the location and route of an individual state highway project. I.e. § 40-310. The Board is 
required to serve written notice of these hearings, by certified or registered mail, on all private 
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property owners like Grathol whose property will be acquired for the project, either through 
purchase or condemnation. I.e. § 40-310(1 )(a). This process is controlled and directed by the 
Board and occurs long before an administrative order of condemnation is executed. Id. The 
Board must also satisfy federal requirements for public hearings and comment. See, e.g., R. at 
191 ("Whereas, the STIP was developed in accordance with all applicable federal requirements 
including adequate opportunity for public involvement and comment."). 
E. The Board Approved The Acquisition Of All Properties Needed For The US-95 
Project. 
The Idaho Transportation Board approved both the route of the US-95 Project and the 
acquisition of each parcel ofland needed for the Project, including the Grathol property. See 
infra Section IV(B)(6). The Board's approval of the condemnation ofa portion of the Grathol 
property occurred long before the administrative order of condemnation was executed by the 
Director of lTD. !d. 
F. Events Prior To Condemnation Of The Grathol Property. 
After approving the US-95 Project, its route, and the properties to be acquired, lTD began 
the process of design, right-of-way acquisition, and contract bidding. ITD's record of right-of-
way negotiations show that ITD served the right-of-way acquisition packet on Grathol's 
representatives on June 19,2010. This packet included the statement of property owner rights 
required under I.e. § 7-71-1 A, plans showing the location and route of the project across the 
Grathol property and specifically showing the portion ofthe Grathol property to be acquired, and 
a copy of an appraisal of the Grathol property commissioned by lTD. With the packet delivered 
on June 19,2010, ITD conveyed to Grathol its offer to purchase the portion of property needed 
for the US-95 Project for $628,100. Tr. at 17-18. Grathol rejected the offer in late June, 
demanding instead the payment of between $2.5 and $3 million. Tr. at 18. 
After being unable to reach agreement with Grathol for the purchase of its property, 
ITD initiated the administrative process to prepare for condemnation ofthe property. The legal 
department of lTD prepared the administrative order of condemnation. The Director of ITD 
signed the administrative order of condemnation on November 17, 2010, along with the Right of 
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Way Manager, Chief Engineer, and Legal Counsel. R. at 16-18 (Ex. C to lTD's CompI.) (admin. 
ord. of condemn.). The Director signed on behalf of the "Idaho Transportation Department." 
R. at 18. The order expressly noted the Board's prior approval of the acquisition of the Grathol 
property: "The Board, having considered the report and recommendations of the State Highway 
Administrator, and having duly considered the matter finds .... " R. at 16. 
The Director is authorized by statute and by the Idaho Transportation Board to authorize 
and execute administrative orders of condemnation for parcels of land needed to complete state 
highway projects approved by the Board. See I.C. § 40-505 (the Director has general supervision 
and control of all activities and functions of the Department); I.C. § 67-2403 (the Director is 
authorized to execute all powers and duties vested by law in the Department); ITD Board Policy 
B-03-01 (R. at 173-174) (the Director has authority to authorize and execute administrative 
orders of condemnation on behalf of the Board). The Director's authority to authorize and 
execute administrative orders of condemnation as to individual parcels of land "attaches at the 
time projects are approved by the Board[.]" Id. As noted above, Board approval of a project 
includes the route and location of the project and the acquisition of all properties needed for the 
project. 
Thus, by the time the Director authorized and executed the administrative order of 
condemnation for the Grathol property, the Idaho Transportation Board had already formally 
approved, on repeated occasions, both the US-95 Project and the acquisition ofthe Grathol 
property. See infra Section IV(B)(6). This sequence of events occurs on all ITD projects and 
administrative orders of condemnation. Id. 
G. Only The Idaho Transportation Board Exercised The Power Of Eminent Domain. 
The State ofIdaho, Idaho Transportation Board filed this condemnation action on 
November 19,2010. R. at 1 (Complaint, at 1). As the Plaintiff, the Board is the entity that 
exercised the power of eminent domain. Prior to filing the condemnation Complaint, no power 
of eminent domain had been exercised by lTD, and no attempt to acquire the Grathol property by 
power of eminent domain had occurred. 
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H. lTD Is Not Constructing Sylvan Road Across Grathol's Property. 
Jason Minzghor is the District 1 Project Development Engineer for lTD. The US-95 
Project is in District 1 of the Idaho Transportation Department. As the District 1 Project 
Development Engineer, Mr. Minzghor is responsible for managing and administering the 
planning and design of state highway projects in District 1. R. at 157, ~~ 2-3. 
Grathol contends that lTD is secretly condemning land for Sylvan or Roberts Road. 
However, the US-95 Project does not involve construction of Sylvan Road, and lTD is not 
condemning land from Grathol for the construction of Sylvan Road. As stated by Mr. Minzghor: 
10. Contrary to the claim in Grathol' s brief in opposition to the motion for 
possession of the property, lTD is not condemning any portion of the Grathol 
property in order to construct an extension of the Sylvan/Roberts Road as part of 
the US-95 Garwood to Sagle Project. lTD's Complaint does not seek to condemn 
any property from Grathol for construction of any such extension. The only 
property being acquired by lTD in this case is property needed for the realignment 
ofUS-95 and the construction of the Highway 54 interchange. 
* * * 
17. In this eminent domain proceeding, lTD is not condemning any portion of 
Grathol's property for an extension of Sylvan/Roberts Road. 
R. at 159-160 (Minzghor Aff., ~~ 10, 17). Grathol has not presented any testimony or any 
factual evidence to the contrary. 
After an evidentiary hearing and based on uncontroverted testimony, the district court 
found that lTD is not condemning any land for Sylvan Road. 
The order of condemnation does not provide or in this court's opinion does not 
provide for the taking of the defendant's property for the expansion ofthe Sylvan 
Road and Roberts Road. The contemplation of the expansion of Sylvan Road to 
link to Roberts Road is certainly mentioned in the order of condemnation, but 
more importantly, the complaint does not contemplate the extension of that road, 
and that is not the subject of the taking that is before this court. The Idaho 
Department of Transportation has offered to expand those roads through Grathol' s 
property -- rather, the Sylvan Road expansion through Grathol's property, but that 
offer has been declined by the defendant and this has been testified to amply 
before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition. 
Tr. 61 :2-16. Again, Grathol offered no contrary evidence to the district court. 
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I. The Property Identified In The Administrative Order Of Condemnation Is Identical 
To The Property Later Condemned In The Complaint. 
The administrative order of condemnation identifies and defines the property to be 
condemned by reference to the Project construction plan sheets. See R. at 16, ~~ 2, 3. The plan 
sheets were then attached to the Complaint filed by the Idaho Transportation Board to identify 
and define the property condemned from Gratho!. R. at 5, ~ 18; 11-15. Thus, the property to be 
condemned from Grathol identified in the administrative order of condemnation is identical to 
the condemned property described in the Complaint. Compare R. at 5, ~ 18; 11-15 (Compl., 
at ~ 18 and Ex. B (construction plan sheets)) with R. 16 ~~ 2,3 (admin. ord. of condemn., 
referencing the construction plan sheets). No change occurred in the construction plan sheets in 
the two days between execution of the administrative order of condemnation on November 17, 
2010 (R. at 18), and the filing of the Complaint on November 19,2010. (R. at 1). 
J. Grathol's Motive For Seeking Condemnation For Sylvan Road Is To Improperly 
Shift The Required Costs Of Its Development To The Tax Paying Public. 
Grathol's eagerness to have its land condemned for Sylvan Road begs the question-
why? According to Grathol, "Defendant is an entity versed in the development and construction 
of commercial retail projects for profit. Defendant acquired the subject property, accomplished 
a zone change and has been actively engaged in pursuit of a development plan for the property." 
R. at 91. In Idaho, cities and counties generally require developers of residential and commercial 
developments to construct the roads within the developments, and then dedicate those roads to 
the public with the plat. See, e.g., I.C. § 50-1309 (requiring owners of new developments to 
"make a dedication of all public streets and rights-of-way shown on said plat"). The Grathol 
property is in Kootenai County. Kootenai County has adopted specific ordinances requiring 
dedications of roads within new developments. 
Section 9-9-2 of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances regulating commercial zones 
requires that every "Commercial Lot shall have direct access from a public road." See Appendix 
A., at 2. Thus, every individual lot within the 40-acre commercial development proposed by 
Grathol will, by law, have to have access from a public road. Similarly, Section 10-3-1 (B)( 4)( e) 
RESPONDENT lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 9 
of the Kootenai County zoning ordinances (identifying the services and infrastructure that the 
developer must construct to serve a commercial subdivision) requires" [p]ublicly-maintained 
road access to each lot, as approved by the Highway District." See Appendix B, at p. 33 of 
Ordinance. Section 10-3-1 (D)(2) requires the interior roads constructed by the developer to meet 
highway district or lTD standards. "Road rights-of-way shall meet the requirements of the 
Highway District or, if applicable, lTD." Id. atp. 35 of Ordinance. Section 10-3-1(D)(2) further 
makes clear that the developer will be required to dedicate the fully constructed roads within the 
development to the county or local highway district: "Except for gated communities and 
common driveways approved by the Board [of county commissioners], roads and associated 
rights-of-way shall be dedicated to the applicable highway agency." Id. (brackets and emphasis 
added). 
In summary, in order for Grathol to proceed with commercial development of its 
property, Kootenai County will require Grathol to construct internal roads within its 
development that meet highway district standards, so that each commercial lot will have the 
required direct access from a public road. To make the interior roads "public," Kootenai County 
will require Grathol to dedicate the internal roads within its development to the local highway 
district. 
Therefore, Grathol's motive in trying to force lTD to condemn land for Sylvan Road is 
obvious. Under Kootenai County's ordinances, Grathol will be required to construct the road at 
its expense and dedicate the road and the land to the county highway district as a condition of 
approval for commercial development of its property. By making the claim regarding Sylvan 
Road in this case, Grathol is trying to foist the costs of a commercial development onto the 
public that should rightfully and legally be borne by Grathol, the commercial developer. 
Regardless of its motive, Grathol cannot force lTD to condemn property for a local street or 
property that ITD does not need for a state highway project. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard Of Review. 
In eminent domain proceedings in Idaho, "all issues, whether legal or factual, other than 
just compensation, are for resolution by the trial court." City oj Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 
851,857,853 P.2d 596, 602 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 222-23,596 
P.2d 75,94-95 (1978); Tibbs v. City ojSandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 
(1979)). The court, and not the jury, is to determine "whether a taking occurred, the nature of the 
property interest taken, and when the taking occurred." Lindsey, 123 Idaho at 857, 853 P.2d at 
602. Thus, in ruling on lTD's motion for possession of the Grathol property needed for the 
US-95 Project, the issue of the authority of the Director ofITD and the scope ofthe taking were 
properly decided by the district court. 
In ruling on the scope of the taking, the district court necessarily made a factual finding 
that lTD is not condemning any property from Grathol for Sylvan/Roberts Road. A district 
court's finding offact will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See, e.g., 
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 857,230 P.3d 743, 749 (2010). A district court's findings of fact 
are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence, even if 
conflicting evidence exists. Id. Similarly, "'[t]his Court will not substitute its view of the facts 
for that of the trial court.'" Id. (quoting Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 511,211 P.3d 118, 120 
(2009)). Prior to and at the evidentiary hearing un lTD's motion for possession, Grathol offered 
no testimony or factual evidence to support its claim. All ofthe facts and testimony showed that 
lTD is not condemning land for Sylvan Road. 
B. The Director Of The Idaho Transportation Department Has Statutory And 
Administrative Authority To Authorize And Execute Administrative Orders Of 
Condemnation. 
1. Grathol's Argument Has No Legal Support. 
Grathol has not cited any Idaho statute or case that has declared that the Director of lTD 
may not authorize and execute an administrative order of condemnation. Grathol's argument 
ignores the expansive statutory authority granted to the Director, including "general supervision 
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and control of all activities and functions" of lTD (LC. § 40-505), and the authority to "execute 
the powers and discharge the duties vested by law in his department." LC. § 67-2403. 
2. Findings And Conclusion Of The District Court. 
At the hearing on lTD's motion for possession, the district court made the following 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw on this issue. 
This court finds that the board, the plaintiff in the matter, does have the right to 
condemn property. Idaho Code section 40-311 provides that the board has the 
authority to condemn property. Idaho Code section 40-314 provides that the 
board has the authority to exercise any powers deemed necessary to fully 
implement and carry out the provisions of Title 40 which relate to highways or 
bridges, the subject matter of this particular litigation. 
The board's policy B-03-01 delegates the authority to condemn a property to the 
director of the Idaho Department of -- or Idaho Transportation. Department. This 
court finds that the Idaho Transportation Department and its director are entities 
that are beneath, in the umbrella sense, the Idaho Transportation Board. 
The board voted to approve this policy at its May 14, 2007 and August 20, 2008 
regular meetings. Further, Idaho Code section 40-505 provides that the director 
or gives the director of the Idaho Transportation Department the authority to 
exercise all necessary incidental powers and enforce all rules and regulations of 
the board. 
On November 17 of 20 10, the director of the Idaho Transportation Department 
exercised that granted authority and issued or entered an order of condemnation 
regarding defendant's property. That order of condemnation has now become 
part of and attached to by the State ofIdaho, Idaho Transportation Department in 
the particular matter before the Court. 
The board has approved this particular project in 2005 and has approved the 
project every year since by approving in its regular meetings the state 
transportation -- or the STIP, as it's referred to, State Transportation Improvement 
Project. 
The Idaho legislature has approved Garvee, G-A-R-V-E-E, funding for the 
project, which is codified in Idaho Code section 40-315, subsection 1, subsection 
B. 
Tr. 59:14-61 :2. The district court's ruling is well supported in the law and by the facts in this 
case, and should be upheld on appeal. 
RESPONDENT lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 12 
3. The Director Of The Idaho Department Of Transportation Has Statutory 
Authority To Authorize And Sign An Administrative Order Of 
Condemnation. 
The legislature has given the Director ofITD broad powers of administration and 
execution of actions on behalf of the Idaho Transportation Department. 
The director shall be the technical and administrative officer of the board 
and under the board's control, supervision and direction, shall have general 
supervision and control of all activities, functions and employees of the 
department. He shall enforce all provisions of the laws of the state relating to 
the department, the rules and regulations of the board, and shall exercise all 
necessary incidental powers. 
I.C. § 40-505. (emphasis added). 
Grathol contends that "incidental" powers means "minor" or "trivial" powers and could 
not mean that the Director may authorize or sign an administrative order of condemnation. 
However, Black's Law Dictionary defines the term much differently than suggested by Grathol. 
Incident power. A power that, although not expressly granted must exist 
because it is necessary to the accomplishment of an express purpose - also 
termed incidental power. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1207 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, the actual definition establishes that the 
term means important powers that "must exist" to accomplish the "express purpose" of being 
charged with "general supervision and control of all activities and functions" ofITD. 
The Director's powers under § 40-505 are expansive and reflect the important role and 
status of the Director. This is particularly true since the Board onfy meets once a month (I.C. 
§ 40-308), except in exigent circumstances, and is comprised of citizen representatives appointed 
by the Governor. The Director manages the daily operations of the Department and does all 
things necessary to implement and enforce the policies and transportation projects approved by 
the Board. 
In Idaho, the head of a state department, referred to as the "director," is statutorily 
authorized to execute all powers and discharge all duties that are vested in that department: 
Each department, unless specifically provided otherwise, shall have an officer 
as its executive and administrative head who shall be known as a director. The 
director of each department shall, subject to the provisions of law, execute the 
powers and discharge the duties vested by law in his department. 
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I.e. § 67-2403 (emphasis added). See also I.C. § 67-2406 (designating the Idaho Transportation 
Department an agency encompassed by § 67-2403). Thus, the Director ofITD is statutorily 
empowered to "execute the powers and discharge the duties vested by law in his department." 
I.C. § 67-2403. Obviously, the power of eminent domain is one of the powers and duties vested 
by law in the Idaho Transportation Department. See I.C. § 40-311 (1). No statute "specifically 
provides otherwise" or in any way bars the Director from authorizing and executing 
administrative orders of condemnation. Moreover, the only exercise of the power of eminent 
domain here is the filing of the condemnation complaint, which was filed by and in the name of 
the Idaho Transportation Board, not the Director. 
4. Grathol's Narrow Construction Of The Exercise Of Statutory Powers By 
lTD Would Deprive The Director Of All Power And Render The Position 
Meaningless. 
Grathol contends that only the Idaho Transportation Board may take any action leading 
up to the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Grathol bases this argument on the fact that 
the statute conferring the power of eminent domain to the Idaho Transportation Department is 
I.C. § 40-311, which enumerates powers ofthe Board. 
All specific, enumerated powers of the Idaho Transportation Department are set forth in 
statutes pertaining to the Board. See I.C. §§ 40-310 to 40-313, and 40-317. All powers of the 
Director are expansive, yet general. See I.C. §§ 40-505; 67-2403. GratllOl argues that only the 
Board may exercise powers under the statutes that reference the Board. Consequently, since all 
specific, enumerated powers of lTD are codified under statutory provisions pertaining to the 
Board, if Grathol's construction of these statutes is accepted, only the Board will be able to act 
under the enumerated powers of lTD. Therefore the Director, having no specific enumerated 
powers, will have no power, and will not be permitted to take any action on behalf ofITD or the 
Board. This cannot be the intent ofthe legislature in creating the position of Director and 
conferring on the Director expansive powers, including the power of "general supervision and 
control of all activities and functions" ofITD. I.C. § 40-505. Grathol's construction is also 
unworkable, because the Board is comprised of citizen members who only meet once per month, 
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whereas the Director is a full time paid employee of the State ofIdaho and is the only person in a 
position to manage the daily operations ofITD and execute its administrative functions - such as 
the authorization and execution of an administrative order of condemnation. 
5. The Director Of The Idaho Department Of Transportation Has 
Administrative Authority To Authorize And Sign An Administrative Order 
Of Condemnation. 
The legislature has authorized the Idaho Transportation Board to make rules and 
regulations regarding the manner in which the powers and actions of ITD are carried out. Idaho 
Code § 40-314(3) provides that the Board shall: 
(3) Exercise any other powers and duties, including the adoption of rules and 
regulations, deemed necessary to fully implement and carry out the provisions of 
this title and the control of the financial affai1;s of the board and the department. 
I.C. § 40-314 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Board has the statutory authority to implement 
rules regarding the internal ITD processes which lead to the Board's exercise of the power of 
eminent domain. 
The Board ofITD has adopted rules which authorize the Director to implement and carry 
out the policies and transportation projects approved and adopted by the Board. Among these 
rules, the Board has given the Director authority to authorize and execute administrative orders 
of condemnation to implement projects approved by the Board: 
The Director, or a delegate, is authorized to purchase, sell, exchange, and execute 
corrcsponding deeds for real estate parcels. The Chief Engineer, or a oelegate, 
with the concurrence ofthe applicable District Engineer, may authorize an 
administrative settlement of up to $200,000 over the reviewed fair market value 
of the property. The Director is further delegated authority to authorize and 
execute on behalf of the Board an Order of Condemnation for individual parcels 
of land. The authority to condemn shall be attached at the time projects are 
approved by the Board and made part of the lTD Project Development Schedule 
and shall include projects in the preliminary development schedule. 
R. 173 (Idaho Transportation Board, Policy B-03-0 1) (emphasis added). See also R. at 166 
(Vogt Aff., 17). The key provisions of this policy for purposes of this appeal are the fact that the 
Director may only authorize and execute administrative orders of condemnation "on behalf of 
the Board" and only as to projects that "are approved by the Board." Thus, the administrative 
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order of condemnation in this case begins "The Board, having considered the report and 
recommendations of the State Highway Administrator and having duly considered the matter, 
finds: .... " R. at 16. 
Board Policy B-03-01 properly reflects the Director's statutory authority as the "technical 
and administrative officer of the board" and his statutorily-conferred "general supervision and 
control ofal! activities, functions and employees of the department." I.C. § 40-505 (emphasis 
added). Board Policy B-03-01 also properly reflects the Director's statutory power and authority 
to "execute the powers and discharge the duties vested by law in his department." I.C. § 67-
2403 (emphasis added). 
Policy B-03-01 was formally enacted by the Board on March 18, 1997, and has been in 
place for 14 years. R. at 166 (Vogt Aff. ~ 8). Since that time, hundreds of administrative orders 
of condemnation in dozens of state highway projects have been executed in accordance with this 
policy. Id. 
6. The Idaho Transportation Board Approved The US-95 Project And The 
Acquisition Of The Grathol Property For The Project. 
The Director signed the administrative order of condemnation on November 17, 2010. 
Based on that date, Grathol relies on the minutes ofthe November, 2010 meeting of the Idaho 
Transportation Board for its contention that the Idaho Transportation Department did not 
approve the US-95 Project or the acquisition of the Grathol propelty because no such approval is 
reflected in the minutes of the Board meeting. Grathol further contends that the Board failed to 
make those decisions in an open meeting. 
Grathol's argument again reflects its lack of understanding of the process for approving 
state highway projects and the acquisition of private property for transportation projects, and the 
role of the Idaho Transportation Board in that process. In claiming that the Board did not 
approve the condemnation of its property, Grathol points to the wrong date, at the wrong stage in 
the US-95 Project, and the wrong documents. Grathol also ignores the fact that the Director 
signed the administrative order of condemnation, not in his individual capacity, but on behalf of 
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the Idaho Transportation Department. Grathol further ignores the fact that the order 
acknowledges the Board's prior determination of the need for a portion of the Grathol property 
and the findings of the Board on that issue. See R. at 16 (admin. ord. of condemn.). 
The Board is involved in and makes the decision to acquire property, by purchase or 
condemnation, through its year-long involvement in the STIP process. As previously noted, the 
STIP program is the formal process by which the Board selects and approves individual state 
highway projects for construction. Prior to approving the location and route of a project, and 
prior to adoption of the STIP each year, the Board holds public hearings and takes public 
comment in accordance with Idaho Code § 40-31 O( 1). In addition, prior to adoption of the STIP 
each year, the Board affirms that all federal requirements for public involvement and comment 
have been met. See, e.g., R. at 191. 
Under Idaho Code § 40-310(1), the Board holds hearings during the course of the STIP 
process in the nearest city in each area affected by or within which a state highway project is 
proposed for construction. The hearing must be held before the Board makes its decision 
approving the project. Id. As part of that process, lTD is required to serve written notice 
"setting forth the action proposed to be taken by the board" on the mayor of any city affected by 
the proposed state highway project and "upon all property owners from which acquisition of 
right-of-way is necessary and from which property must be purchased, by certified or registered 
mail[.]" Id. 
All property owners whose property will be acquired for a project are entitled to appear 
before the Board and be heard. "At the hearing, a property owner from which right-of-way is 
necessary to be acquired and from which that property must be purchased ... may appear, voice 
objections to the action proposed to be taken by the board, and may present evidence and call 
witnesses in support of their objections." Id. The Board then issues written decisions on the 
objections, and property owners who object to a decision may appeal the Board's decision 
directly to the district court. Id. It is through this process that the Board specifically approves 
the acquisition of the parcels of property to be acquired for each state highway project. Id. 
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This is the process by which the Board considered and approved the acquisition of the Grathol 
property. 
At the culmination of this year-long STIP process, and following the hearings and 
decisions by the Board on individual projects and acquisitions of properties required under Idaho 
Code § 40-310, the Board then conducts another public hearing on the proposed STIP for the 
coming year. See R. at 175-260 (minutes of Board meetings approving and adopting annual 
STIPs for fiscal years 2005-2010) (Vogt Aff., Exs. 2-11). 
Thus, during the course ofthe STIP process, all property owners whose properties are to 
be acquired for a project have been given notice and an opportunity to appear before the Board, 
present evidence, call witnesses, and voice objections. The Board has heard and considered 
testimony from affected property owners, and has made decisions on their objections that may be 
appealed directly to district court. I.C. § 40-310(1 )(b). After making decisions on individual 
projects, including the route of each the project and the properties needed for the projects, the 
Board then makes its final decision announcing the projects that will be included in the STIP and 
the order in which the projects will be constructed. That decision is set forth in the annual STIP, 
which is approved and adopted by the Board in another public hearing. 
If and when negotiations for the purchase of a parcel fail and a condemnation suit must 
be initiated, the Board does not take up the issue of the need for the condemnation of individual 
parcels of property again. The Board has already made that determination. Therefore, if an 
administrative order of condemnation is needed, the Director has the authority to authorize and 
execute an administrative order on behalf of the Board. The Director's authority to authorize and 
execute administrative orders of condemnation attaches at the time the Board approves the 
project. R. at 173 (Board Policy B-03-01). Even then, an administrative order of condemnation 
is authorized "on behalf of the Board" and only if lTD is unable to negotiate for the purchase of 
the property. Id. 
By the time an administrative order of condemnation is prepared and executed, the Idaho 
Transportation Board has already approved the route of a project and the property needed to be 
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acquired for the project. As such, the administrative order as to the Grathol property specifically 
affirms as follows: 
The Board, having duly considered the report and recommendations of the State 
Highway Administrator and having duly considered the matter, finds: 
1. That the above-designated project is for the purpose of 
constructing a section of the State Highway System in the location as 
noted above. 
2. That the right of way necessary for the project consists in part of 
certain real property located in the county as noted above, and which 
property has been designated and shown as the above parcel on the plans 
of said proj ect now on file in the office of the Idaho Transportation 
Department. 
3. That the parcel so designated and shown on said project plans is 
necessary to the construction of said project and the construction of said 
project is impossible without the acquisition of said parcel. 
R. at 15 (Ex. C to lTD's CompI.) (admin. ord. of condemn., at 1). By the time the Director 
authorized and executed this administrative order of condemnation on November 17, 2010, the 
US-95 Project and the acquisition of all of the properties needed for the Project had been the 
subject of multiple hearings and approvals by the Board as part ofthe STIP process. The US-95 
Project has been approved in the STIP program every year since 2005. 
The Idaho Transportation Board is comprised of private citizens. They meet once a 
month, in an open meeting, generally for a day and a half. See I.C. § 40-308 (the Board shall 
meet 12 times per year). Particularly in light of the time constraints of its citizen members, the 
Board is not able and is not required by law to hold yet another meeting to determine whether an 
administrative order of condemnation should issue. The Board has already concluded that the 
property must be acquired for the project and has approved its acquisition by purchase or 
condemnation. 
The relative roles of a citizen board and the chief administrative officer of a state 
highway transportation department have been addressed in case law. 
[T]he Chief Engineer of the State Highway Department is an extremely important 
officer in that Department, to whom the General Assembly has delegated the daily 
discharge of the duties and functions of the Department. He is a salaried fulltime 
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employee, as opposed to the members of the Department [Board], itself, who are 
non-paid, non-professional appointees ... the members of the Department who 
meet only periodically, act in the capacity which in private corporate activities is 
filled by a Board of Directors, and the Chief Engineer is the executive head ofthe 
Department charged with the responsibility of carrying out the broad policy 
decisions made by the members of the Department. 
0.106 Of An Acre Of Land v. State, 130 A.2d 355, 359 (Del. 1957) (brackets added) (holding that 
the chief engineer had authority to decide to commence a condemnation action). !d. at 360. 
If negotiations for the purchase of a piece of property are unsuccessful, the Idaho 
Transportation Board has already held the requisite hearings and has already made the decision 
that the property is necessary for the project and must be acquired. Thus, the authorization and 
execution of an administrative order of condemnation at that point is a ministerial act by the 
Director who, as the "administrative officer" of the Idaho Transportation Department, has both 
statutory authority and has been directed by the Board to do so. 
In addition to the hearings before the Board and the opportunity under Idaho Code 
§ 40-310 to appeal the decision to condemn its property, Grathol has had full opportunity in this 
condemnation action to challenge whether the US-95 Project is a public use and whether its 
property is needed for the Project. "Public use" and "necessity" are both issues that a property 
owner may contest in a condemnation action. However, Grathol admitted that the US-95 Project 
is a public use authorized by law. See R. at 140. In addition, Grathol has not disputed that the 
acquisition of the condemned property is necessary for the US-95 Project. R. at 140-141. 
7. The Idaho Supreme Court Has Not Questioned The Authority Of The 
Director To Authorize And Sign An Administrative Order Of 
Condemnation. 
In State ex ref. Winder v. Canyon Vista Family Ltd. P'ship, 148 Idaho 718,228 P.3d 985, 
(2010), this Court addressed the issue of whether the complaint or the administrative order of 
condemnation defines the scope of a taking in a condemnation case. It concluded that "the 
complaint defines the nature and scope of the take" and not the administrative order of 
condemnation. ld. at 727, 228 P .3d at 994. 
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The administrative order of condemnation was squarely at issue in the Winder case. 
Idaho Transportation Board Policy B-03-01 (R. at 173-174) was enacted in 1997 and has been in 
place for 14 years. R. at 166 (Vogt Aff. at ~ 8). Since then, hundreds of administrative orders of 
condemnation in dozens of state highway projects have been executed in accordance with this 
policy. Id. This includes the administrative order of condemnation at issue in Winder. l The 
administrative order of condemnation at issue in the Winder case is identical in form to the 
administrative order in this case, and was signed by the Director ofITD and not the Board. 
The record in the Winder case shows that no concern or question was raised by the Court or the 
landowner regarding the authority or propriety of the Director signing the administrative order of 
condemnation. 
8. The Idaho Supreme Court Has Recognized The Authority Of The Director 
To Act On Behalf Of The Board. 
Grathol contends that if a power of ITD is listed under a section of the Idaho Code 
referring to the Board, that power may only be exercised by the Board and no orders or decisions 
can be authorized or signed by anyone but the Board. This argument is contrary to the statutes 
vesting expansive powers in the Director and existing Idaho case law. 
For example, in Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439, 247 P.3d 666 (2011), a property owner 
challenged the decision of the Idaho Transportation Department to grant his neighbor a permit to 
expand an encroachment on IIighway 55. Id. at 441,247 P.3d at 668. The case involved powers 
conferred by statute to the Idaho Transportation Board under Idaho Code § § 40-310 and 40-312. 
Id. at 442-43,247 P.3d 669-70. The Court did not refer to these powers as "exclusive powers of 
the Board," but rather as "powers ofITD" or "ITD's authority." Id. The Court declared that 
"[t]he Idaho Code confers to the lTD the power to '[ e]stablish standards for the location, design, 
construction, reconstruction, alteration, extension, repair and maintenance of state highways. '" 
1 Attached hereto as Appendix C is a copy of the administrative order of condemnation in the 
Winder case. This copy was obtained from the records of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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Id. at 443,247 P.2d at 670 (citing I.e. §§ 40-310(5) and 40-312(1), which are sections of the 
code enumerating powers of the Board). 
The decision and written order by lTD challenged by the plaintiff in Vickers was signed 
not by the Board, but by the Director of lTD, even though the authority for the decision and 
order were statutory provisions enumerating powers of the Board. Specifically, the plaintiff 
argued "that lTD has no authority to issue conditional-encroachment permits." Id. at 442,247 
P.3d at 669. The Supreme Court noted as follows: 
Vickers petitioned the lTD to deny Savala's variance and conditional 
permit. After a two-day hearing, the hearing officer issued his Recommended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order ("Recommended 
Order") ... The lTD Director then issued a Final Order adopting the 
Recommended Order. Vickers sought judicial review of this final order, but the 
district court affirmed the lTD and awarded fees and costs. 
Id. (emphasis added). On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found statutory authority for lTD's 
actions in Idaho Code §§ 40-310 and 40-312, which confer powers to the Idaho Transportation 
Board. However, no question was raised and no concern was expressed by the Court or the 
plaintiff that the Director had issued the Final Order, and not the Board. The propriety of the 
Director's action is made clear by the Director's statutory authority and powers under § 40-505, 
as well as § 67-2403, which provides that "[t]he director of each department shall, subject to the 
provisions oflaw, execute the powers and discharge the duties vested by law in his department." 
See also Wylie v. State of Idaho, Idaho Transportation Bd., 151 Idaho 26,33,253 P.3d 700, 707 
(2011) (referring to the powers ofthe Board under I.C. § 40-310(9) as vesting authority in lTD 
and not simply the Board). 
9. The Cases Cited By Grathol Do Not Support Its Argument That The 
Director May Not Authorize And Execute Administrative Orders Of 
Condemnation. 
In the face of clear statutory and administrative authority for the Director of lTD to sign 
administrative orders of condemnation, Grathol cites Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193, 
207 P.3d 169 (2009), for the proposition that Board cannot delegate condemnation authority to 
the Director. This case does not support Grathol's position for the following reasons: 
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First, the Idaho Transportation Board did not delegate "condemnation authority" to the 
Director. As previously noted, the Board approved the US-95 Project and the acquisition of the 
Grathol property long before the Director signed the administrative order of condemnation. 
Second, the Director signed the administrative order of condemnation on behalf of the 
"Idaho Transportation Department." R. at 16 (signature page of the administrative order of 
condemnation). This makes clear that the Idaho Transportation Department will condemn the 
property, not the Director. lTD did not exercise its power of eminent domain until it filed this 
condemnation action. In addition, the suit was brought by and in the name of the Idaho 
Transportation Board . 
. Third, Terrazas has nothing to do with lTD, its Director, or the Idaho Transportation 
Board. In Terrazas, the Blaine County Board of Commissioners denied Terrazas' application 
for a proposed subdivision, and Terrazas filed for judicial review of that administrative decision. 
Id. at 196-197, 207 P.3d at 172-73. Both the district court and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Id. at 205, 207 P.3d at 181. From this case, 
Grathol isolates one quote: 
Under Idaho law, county boards are vested with the exclusive, non-delegable, 
authority to finally approve subdivision applications. I.C. § 67-6504; Cowan v. 
Bd. ofComm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 511-12, 148 P.3d 1247, 1257-
58 (2006). 
Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 198,207 P.3d at 174. The discussion in Cowan on which the Terrazas 
decision relied involved whether a planning and zoning board had the authority to approve a 
subdivision. Cowan v. Bd. ofComm'rs, 143 Idaho at 511-12, 148 P.3d at 1257-58 (2006). 
Nothing in either of these cases restricts or limits the authority of the Idaho Transportation Board 
under Idaho Code § 40-314 to adopt rules, such as Board Policy B-03-0 1, deemed necessary to 
carry out the provisions of Title 40. Nor does either case address or limit the ability of the 
Director of the Idaho Transportation Department to carry out his or her statutorily-conferred 
administrative powers and duties under Idaho Code § 40-505, including the authorization and 
execution of administrative orders of condemnation. Title 40 makes clear that the Board makes 
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policies and approves projects, and the Director executes and administers those policies and 
projects. 
Grathol also cites Roberts v. Transp. Dept., 121 Idaho 727, 827 P.2d 1178 (Ct. App. 
1991), which held that "[a]n agency must exercise any authority granted by statute within the 
framework of that statutory grant. It may not exercise its sub-legislative power to modify, alter, 
enlarge or diminish the provisions ofthe legislative act which is being administered." Id. at 732, 
827 P.2d at 1183. Here, the authority at issue is the statutory grant of the power of eminent 
domain to the Idaho Transportation Board. I.C. § 40-311 (1). The Board has done nothing to 
"modify, alter, enlarge, or diminish" the power of eminent domain conferred on the Board. The 
only exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case was the filing of the condemnation 
complaint. The complaint was filed by and in the name of the Idaho Transportation Board. 
Nothing in Idaho Code § 40-311 (1) bars the Director of ITD, the administrative officer of the 
Board, from signing an administrative order of condemnation on behalf of the Board. 
Grathol also cites Cowlitz County v. Martin, 177 P.3d 102 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). In that 
case, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the county could not condemn property under 
the state's Salmon Recovery Act because the Act gave no power of condemnation to the county. 
In addition, the general statute giving the power of eminent domain to the county did not list 
"salmon recovery" as a permissible public use for which the power of eminent domain could be 
exercised. Id. at 104-05. The resolution by the county commission, comparable to the 
administrative order of condemnation in this case, described the purpose of the condemnation as 
removing and replacing an existing culvert that had been identified as a "fish barrier," and that 
funds for the project had been obtained through a grant under the Salmon Recovery Act. Id. at 
103. The resolution authorized the county attorney to file a condemnation action for that 
purpose. Id. 
The county prosecuting attorney filed the condemnation suit. !d. In the condemnation 
complaint, the county attorney added an additional purpose for the condemnation: to enlarge the 
culvert to accommodate stream flows for a 100-year design storm. Id. In other words, the 
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county attorney added a "public use" to the complaint (stonn water management) that was 
authorized in the general statute giving the county the power of eminent domain. Id. That 
purpose had not been part of the administrative resolution by the county commission. Id. at 104. 
The landowners argued that the county had only authorized condemnation for purposes relating 
to salmon recovery, for which it had no power of eminent domain, and the city attorney's action 
constituted "an unlawful delegation of the power of condemnation." Id. at 105-06. The 
Washington Court of Appeals agreed, holding that "a prosecuting attorney does not have 
authority to articulate a different or additional purpose for the condemnation not stated by the 
county." Id. at 106. 
The Cowlitz case has no bearing on the case at hand. The Idaho Transportation Board 
approved the condemnation of Grathol' s property for use in the construction of the US-95 
Project. Condemnation for public highways is a public use authorized by law, which Grathol 
admitted in its answer. See R. at 140. That purpose and use are stated in both the administrative 
order of condemnation and the Complaint. No other use or purpose has been stated, and the 
Director did not add a use or purpose to the administrative order of condemnation, and certainly 
did not do so to cure a defect in the use and purpose given by the Board. 
The Cowlitz case is silent as to who signed the county resolution. It may have been the 
full commission, the head of the commission, or the county clerk. Thus, the case does not 
address the issue presented in this case - whether the Director ofITD, the administrative officer 
of the Idaho Transportation Board, may authorize and sign an administrative order of 
condemnation. In addition, the county attorney's action occurred in the actual exercise of the 
power of eminent domain - in adding to the condemnation complaint. The lTD Director's 
involvement ended with the administrative order of condemnation. After that, the condemnation 
action was filed and pursued by the Idaho Transportation Board. 
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10. Courts Across The Country Have Considered And Rejected Arguments 
Similar To The Argument By Grathol. 
Courts across the country have addressed and rejected arguments that the director or 
officer of a condemning authority may not sign orders of condemnation or take other actions to 
facilitate the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the condemning authority. 
For example, in Gryodyne Co. of Am., Inc., v. State Univ. of NY. at Stony Brook, 794 
N.y'S.2d 87 (N.Y.App.Div. 2005), the landowner argued, as here, that the university's board of 
trustees had unlawfully delegated its statutory power of eminent domain to its chancellor. Id. at 
89. The court disagreed. 
[T]he record does not support the petitioner's contention that the Board of 
Trustees of SUNY Stony Brook improperly delegated their statutory grant of 
the power of eminent domain. The Board of Trustees merely authorized the 
Chancellor, or his designee, to "take all steps and execute or approve in the 
name of and on behalf of this Board all documents, notices, maps or any other 
instruments necessary or proper to effect the acquisition of title to and the 
possession of' the petitioner's property. 
Id. (emphasis added). This holding applies equally to the case at hand. 
In Michael v. City of Bloomington, 804 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), the property 
owners contested the condemnation oftheir property by the city's Board of Public Works, 
arguing that only the city had the statutory power of eminent domain. !d. at 1228-29. The 
Indiana Court of Appeals noted that "the argument rests on the assumption that the Board is an 
entity that is independent of the City of Bloomington." Id. at 1229. The court then held: 
[T]he Board is not a separate governmental entity with powers separate and 
distinct from the City of Bloomington. It is an administrative municipal Board 
of the City of Bloomington. The Board acts only in the name of the City of 
Bloomington, and its authority arises only from its relationship as a subordinate 
entity ofthe City of Bloomington. 
Id. The court therefore ruled that the condemnation was lawful, and further noted that "[t]he 
property acquired through the Board becomes the property of the City of Bloomington, not the 
property ofthe Board." Id. Likewise, lTD's Director is not a "separate governmental entity 
with power separate and distinct" from lTD. He is the administrative officer of the Board. 
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In Richardson v. City & County o/Honolulu, 868 P.2d 1193 (Haw. 1994), the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii held that a city ordinance delegating authority from the city council (designated 
by statute to have the power of eminent domain) to the city housing department to designate land 
to be condemned was not an impermissible delegation of the power of eminent domain. Id. at 
1204-05. The court held that the housing department's designation of the land to be condemned 
was simply "a means of facilitating its acquisition by the city" and was "only a preliminary step 
in the condemnation process that precedes the institution of eminent domain proceedings at the 
behest of the City Council[.]" /d. at 1205. 
In Burner Servo & Combustion Controls Co., Inc. v. City o/Minneapolis, 250 N.W.2d 
224 (Minn. 1977), the city of Minneapolis had the statutory power of eminent domain. The city 
council adopted a resolution in connection with a public project, directing the city attorney to: 
[T]ake all necessary steps to prepare for, institute, and prosecute on behalf and in 
the name of the City of Minneapolis all such condemnation proceedings as may 
by necessary for the acquisition by said City of Minneapolis (of Burner's property 
interest), the costs thereof to be paid from (funds authorized for this purpose). 
Id. at 225 (parentheses in original). The city later attempted to avoid a settlement agreement 
negotiated by the city attorney in the condemnation action, on the grounds that the city attorney 
acted beyond his lawful authority. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, upheld and 
enforced the resolution by the city. "In our opinion there is little doubt that by this resolution the 
city council gave authority to the city attorney to acquire the property from Burner and to agree 
to the prices to be paid for it." /d. at 229. The court cited a provision of Nichols on Eminent 
Domain as the rationale and basis for its decision that no improper delegation of the power of 
eminent domain occurred. 
The real issue here, as stated by Burner, is not whether there was a Redelegation 
of authority by the city to the city attorney, but rather whether there had been an 
Actual exercise of the power by the city itself. The distinction between 
Redelegation and Actual exercise is noted in 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (Ref. 
3ed.) s 3.211(1), which states: 
'Where the power of eminent domain has been granted to a municipality it 
is questionable whether the latter has the right to redelegate such power to 
a subordinate city agency or official. The grant of power by the state is to 
RESPONDENT lTD'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 27 
the city. The municipality has no inherent power of eminent domain but 
acquires its right to deal with the subject from the state. It does not 
acquire the right to redelegate by implication from its delegated powers as 
set forth either in a statute or its charter, although it may be given express 
power to do so. It is equally without power to give itself the right to 
redelegate the power by a municipal ordinance. However, a resolution of 
the city council which authorizes a city attorney to acquire land for a 
municipal purpose is not construed as a redelegation of the power of 
eminent domain, but merely as an official authorization by the city of an 
exercise by the city, in its own right, of the delegated power of eminent 
domain. Since it is a corporate entity it can act only through its officers or 
agents so far as ministerial or administrative acts are concerned.' 
Id. at 227-28. Here, no "redelegation" ofITD's power of eminent domain occurred. The Board 
authorized the Director of lTD to authorize and execute an administrative order of condemnation 
leading to the exercise by the Idaho Transportation Board "in its own right, of the delegated 
power of eminent domain." 
In Cheney v. Strasburger, 357 A.2d 905 (Conn. 1975), the landowners challenged "the 
delegation of the town's power of eminent domain to the board of education." Id. at 908. The 
landowners further argued that the local board of education was in fact an agent of the state and 
could not act for the town. Id. at 908-09. The Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that "a town 
board of education is an agent of the state when carrying out the educational interests ofthe 
state" but were "still officers of the town." !d. at 909. The board was authorized by statute to 
"'perform all acts required of them by the town. ,,, Id. "This means all acts which may be 
lawfully required of them by the town." Id. Accordingly, the court rejected the landowners' 
argument: 
The delegation of power by the town to condemn in its name to the board of 
education was consistent with the duties of the board of education regarding the 
educational policy of the state and with its functions directly relating to school 
facilities. It is certainly a power that the board of education may lawfully exercise 
where requested by the town meeting to act on behalf of the town ... The town of 
Newtown by its referendum had the right and power to delegate its power of 
eminent domain to its board of education, and the board of education, in tum, had 
the authority to exercise such power. 
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!d. (internal citation omitted). Here, the Idaho Transportation Board did not delegate its power 
of eminent domain to another agency or lesser board. On the contrary, the Board authorized its 
own administrative officer to execute an administrative order of condemnation on its behalf. 
In Petition of Mich. State Hwy. Comm 'n, 178 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970), the 
court "was asked whether it is consonant with Act 295, Public Acts of 1966, and the Michigan 
Constitution for the state highway commission to delegate its authority to condemn private 
property, together with the right to make a determination of necessity, to the state highway 
director." Id. at 666. In that case, the administrative determination of necessity was signed 
"'Michigan State Highway Commission, by Nerik E. Stafseth, State Highway Director.'" Id. 
The "declaration of taking" was signed in the same manner. !d. In response to the challenged 
taking, the state confirmed that the state highway commission "had, in fact, delegated to the 
highway director all the powers, authorities and responsibilities ofthe commission." !d. at 667. 
The landowner argued before the trial court and on appeal that Michigan's statutes did 
not permit "the state highway commission to delegate to the state highway director the authority 
to make a determination of necessity for condemnation purposes." Id. The Michigan Court of 
Appeals flatly rejected this argument. 
Id. 
The determination of necessity for taking here was properly made by the state 
highway commission through its director, with the aid of his subordinates, as 
required and authorized by the Constitution of Michigan, Act 286, P.A. 1964 and 
Act 295, Public Acts of 1966. There was no illegal delegation of power and no 
abuse of discretion in these acts, and no error in the holding of the lower court. 
Likewise, in Anne Arundel County v. Bowen, 267 A.2d 168 (Md. Ct. App. 1970), the 
property owner in a condemnation case made the following argument, as framed by the 
Maryland Court of Appeals: 
Fully rendered the Bowens' argument seems to come to this: that the 
Legislature's grant of the power of eminent domain is to the County and that 
it would be improper for the County to delegate it to the County Executive; 
therefore, they conclude, the power cannot be exercised without 'some action by 
the Council with respect to this specific piece of property,' after which 'the 
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Executive Officers (could) carry out the ministerial duties necessary to effectuate 
the action of the Council.' 
Id. at 170. This is precisely the argument made by Grathol in the present case. In rejecting this 
argument, the Maryland Court of Appeals held: 
In a sense it is true, as the Bowens argue, that the power of eminent domain has 
been granted to the County but it is also true that the County can exercise the 
power only through the duly authorized personnel of its executive branch. The 
legislative branch, the Council, by the enactment of Sec. 1-317, supra, has clothed 
the County Executive with the authority and the duty of exercising the power 
whenever its exercise is required in order to complete the execution of any project 
for which the Council has budgeted and appropriated the necessary funds. It 
seems absurd to suggest that the same power granted to the County by the 
Legislature has been delegated to the County Executive. See Master Royalties 
Corp. v. Mayor & City Council o/Baltimore, 235 Md. 74, 83,200 A.2d 652 
(1964) and Pressman v. D 'Alesandro, 193 Md. 672, 69 A.2d 453 (1949). 
Having held, in Hormes, that the County Executive was simply 'executing 
authority granted by laws already in existence' when he negotiated and executed a 
ten-year lease of a floor of an office building, we have no difficulty extending that 
holding to include, in the circumstances here present, the condemnation of the 
Bowens' property. 
Id. at 171-72. In the case at hand, the Director of lTD is designated by statute to be the 
"administrative officer of the board." See I.C. § 40-505. Therefore, "it seems absurd to 
suggest," as Grathol has, that the same power granted to the Board has been delegated to the 
Director. The Director acts only for the Board and is authorized by law and Board policy to do 
so. 
In State v. King County, 446 P.2d 193 (Wash. 1968), the Washington Supreme Court held 
that the state community college board could delegate authority to a community college district 
to acquire property by condemnation because all condemnation actions were to be brought in the 
name ofthe state board. Id. at 194-95. 
In 0.1060/ An Acre 0/ Land v. State, 130 A.2d 355 (Del. 1957), the property owner 
challenged the condemnation on the grounds that the Chief Engineer of the State Highway 
Department, and not its board, made the decision to institute a condemnation action to acquire 
the property in question. Id. at 358. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court of Delaware 
noted the expansive powers conferred upon the Chief Engineer (id. at 358-59), which parallel 
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those given to the Director ofITD under I.C. §§ 40-505 and 67-2403. The court also compared 
the role of the full time Chief Engineer responsible for all daily functions of the department, with 
the citizen board that only met periodically and primarily made policy decisions (id. at 359), 
which again parallels the Director and Board ofITD. Thus, the court concluded "that the Chief 
Engineer was within his authority in directing the institution of condemnation proceedings to 
acquire land required to complete a road project, the over-all approval of which the Department 
had theretofore given." !d. at 360. In the present case, the Idaho Transportation Board had 
already approved the US-95 Project and the acquisition of the properties needed for the Project 
before the Director signed the administrative order of condemnation. 
The Supreme Court of Delaware further explained that the argument by the landowner 
would establish "an unworkable rule" and requiring a citizen board 
[t]o meet in all solemnity and adopt a resolution condemning a particular piece of 
land by metes and bounds. We think such a rule unrealistic in the light of the 
requirements of the development of a modem highway system which requires for 
its expansion not only the acquisition of land but, to acquire such, the frequent use 
of the power of eminent domain. 
Id. at 358. The argument by Grathol would simply force a "re-approval" following a series of 
previous approvals by the Idaho Transportation Board of the US-95 Project and the acquisition, 
by purchase or condemnation, ofthe properties needed for the Project. 
In summary, condemnation case law makes clear that the Director ofITD may authorize 
and execute an administrative order of condemnation. The Idaho Transportation Board 
authorized the US-95 Project and the condemnation ofthe Grathol property. The Idaho 
Transportation Board exercised the power of eminent domain. The Board did not delegate its 
power of eminent domain to another board or agency, separate and apart from lTD. The Director 
did not make the decision to condemn and did not file the condemnation suit on his own. His 
only action was to authorize and execute an administrative order of condemnation, on behalf of 
the Board, prior to the Complaint being filed. The administrative order was a ministerial act, 
reciting the prior approval and findings by the Board. 
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c. lTD Is Not Condemning Any Land For Sylvan Road And Is Not Constructing 
Sylvan Road Across Grathol's Property. 
1. Grathol's Claim Has No Basis In Fact. 
Grathol argues that lTD did not negotiate in good faith because it did not offer 
compensation for the taking of property for the extension of Sylvan Road across its property. 
The Affidavit of Jason Minzghor, lTD District 1 Project Development Engineer, makes clear that 
lTD is not condemning any portion of Grathol' s property for the construction of a Sylvan Road 
extension. R. at 158-160 (Minzghor Aff., ~~ 8-17). See also R. at 4-5 (Complaint, ~~ 12-19); 
and R. at 8-15 (CompI. Exs. A and B) (legal description of the condemned property and the 
construction plan sheets showing the construction ofUS-95 on the Grathol property). lTD has 
no obligation to negotiate just compensation for property it is not taking. 
Grathol's claim regarding Sylvan Road is apparently based on negotiations among lTD, 
Lakes Highway District, and other property owners in the area regarding the potential extension 
of Sylvan Road. R. at 159 (Minzghor Aff., ~ 11). Specifically, Grathol's neighbors approached 
Lakes Highway District and then lTD and asked that Sylvan Road be extended across their 
properties to provide additional access to their properties. Because of the benefits of the 
extended road, those neighbors decided to dedicate portions of their property to the Lakes 
Highway District for that purpose, and lTD agreed to construct the Sylvan Road extension for 
those landowners. Jd. 
In the Fall of 20 10, representatives of lTD met with Grathol and their attorneys. Id. at ~ 
13. At that meeting, lTD explained to Grathol that it would be willing to extend Sylvan Road 
across the Grathol property if they also elected to dedicate the property to Lakes Highway 
District for that extension. Id. at ~ 14. However, Grathol elected not to have the Sylvan/Roberts 
Road extended across their property. R. at 160 (Minzghor Aff., ~~ 15-17). Therefore, lTD is not 
constructing any extension of Sylvan Road on the Grathol property. Id. The only property 
condemned in this case is a portion of the Grathol property needed solely and specifically for 
construction of the US-95 Project. Id. 
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At the hearing on lTD's motion for possession, Mr. Minzghor testified unequivocally that 
lTD is not condemning any property from Grathol for Sylvan Road. See Tr. at 11 :1-8; 13 :9-16; 
20:1-25; 21: 1-24; 33: 1-25; 34: 1 :23 (York Aff., Ex. 1) The construction plans for the US-95 
Project do not call for construction of Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. Tr. at 12: 13-
13: 16. The Project plans show that the property condemned from Grathol property is being used 
exclusively for the US-95 Project. Tr. at 31 :7-22. The Project plans do not call for or involve 
any construction of Sylvan Road on Grathol's property. Tr. at 33:12-34:1; see also R. at 11-15 
(CompI., Ex. B) (Project Plan Sheets for construction of the US-95 Project on the Grathol 
Property). 
lTD has no plans to construct Sylvan Road across the Grathol property in the future. 
Tr. at 33:2-23. Since Sylvan Road is a local street, and not a state highway, if Sylvan Road is 
ever extended across the Grathol property in the future, it may be constructed by some other 
entity such as Lakes Highway District, but it is not being constructed by lTD as part of the US-
95 Project. 
At the possession hearing, counsel for Grathol cross-examined Mr. Minzghor regarding 
whether lTD was condemning any Grathol property to construct Sylvan Road. Mr. Minzghor 
again affirmed that no Grathol property is being condemned to construct Sylvan Road. 
Q. Okay. And this is the Grathol property outlined in blue here; is that correct? 
A. I think it's blue. 
Q. Kind of hard to see the blue. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And you've already testified these white lines depict the proposed construction 
and the area of the condemnation; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This would be Sylvan Road to the south of US Highway 54? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or State Highway 54, I'm sorry. And it depicts nothing here. Do you know 
why that is? 
A. Because at this time we have no plans in constructing Sylvan Road. 
Q. Sylvan Road as a right-of-way does not extend across the Grathol property, 
does it? 
A. That is correct. 
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Q. There's no road on the ground, there's no right-of-way, there's no ownership by the 
state or any county or municipality, is there? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. Now, you said that after August 1 of 201 0, when the proposal was made to 
build the frontage road, you were referring to Sylvan Road, were you not? 
A. Correct. 
Q. After that --
A. The extension of Sylvan Road. 
Q. The extension of Sylvan Road across the Grathol property. You said after that 
date there was no plan for the construction of Sylvan Road as part of this project. 
Did I understand that correctly? 
A. Across the Grathol property, yes. 
Tr. at 23:10-24:19 (emphasis added). 
On re-direct, Mr. Minzghor made clear that the Project plans do not call for or involve 
any construction of Sylvan Road across Grathol's property. 
MR. TOLLEFSON: Q. Jason, these documents that Mr. Marfice put up here, do any of 
these documents dictate or control what lTD is going to condemn or construct? 
A. It does not. 
Q. What does control what lTD is going to construct? 
A. The project plans that we have designed. 
Q. I'd like to tum your attention back to Exhibit 1, which I believe are the right-of-way 
plans. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Are these project plans for this project? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And does this control what will be constructed on the project? 
A. Yes. 
Tr. at 31 :7-22. 
Q. Okay. So is it fair to say you read those that the property that is necessary is 
depicted on the project plans? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And if you look at the top of the order condemnation, what is the project 
number? 
A. 9791. 
Q. I would like to tum your attention back to Exhibit No.1. What are the project plans 
of this project? 
A. 9791. 
Q. And again, does anything on these project plans show condemnation of property for 
the construction of Sylvan Road? 
A. No. 
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Tr. at 33: 12-34: 1. Mr. Minzghor also testified that there are no plans to construct Sylvan Road 
across Grathol's property and nothing in the administrative order of condemnation calls for the 
condemnation of any property for Sylvan Road. 
Q. Mr. Marfice also had you read a section on page 2, 4( e) [ofthe administrative order 
of condemnation]. If you could go back to look at that. And it -- to summarize, it says 
that "In association with the project, the Idaho Transportation Department is in the 
process of extending Sylvan Road to tie into Roberts Road." At some point in time -- or 
excuse me, 
at one point in time it was contemplated that there may be some sort of connection? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But there's no plans for that now? 
A. No. 
Q. Anything that Mr. Marfice has raised up there that require you or lTD or the project 
to construct Sylvan Road? 
A. No. 
Q. Anything that Mr. Marfice has said require ITD to construct Sylvan Road in any 
particular manner or designation? 
A. No. 
Tr. at 34:2-20 (brackets added). 
After an evidentiary hearing and based on extensive, uncontroverted testimony, the 
district court found that lTD is not condemning any land for Sylvan Road. 
The order of condemnation does not provide or in this court's opinion does not 
provide for the taking of the defendant's property for the expansion of the Sylvan 
Road and Roberts Road. The contemplation of the expansion of Sylvan Road to 
link to Roberts Road is certainly mentioned in the order of condemnation, but 
more importantly, the complaint does not contemplate the extension ofthat road, 
and that is not the subject of the taking that is before this court. The Idaho 
Department of Transportation has offered to expand those roads through Grathol's 
property -- rather, the Sylvan Road expansion through Grathol's property, but that 
offer has been declined by the defendant and this has been testified to amply 
before the Court today and in Mr. Minzghor's deposition. 
Tr. at 61 :2-16. The district court's finding and decision are amply supported in the record, and 
no contrary evidence was offered by Grathol. Accordingly, its claim relating to Sylvan Road 
fails as a matter of fact. 
2. Grathol's Claim Based On Sylvan Road Fails As A Matter Of Law. 
The statutory duty to negotiate in good faith to purchase lands needed for a public project 
extends only to that portion of the property needed for the project. I.e. § 7-721(2)(d) 
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(condemnor must negotiate in good faith "to purchase the lands sought to be taken"). A 
condemning agency has no duty to negotiate for the purchase of property it does not need and is 
not condemning. Therefore, Grathol has no legal or factual basis for an interlocutory appeal as 
to the requirement under § 7-721(2) of good faith negotiation, particularly where it seeks to have 
that duty applied to property that ITD is not condemning and does not need for the US-95 
Project. 
Moreover, if Grathol truly believes that lTD is condemning additional property not 
identified in the Complaint, Grathol's proper remedy is to file a counterclaim for inverse 
condemnation. Its remedy is not an interlocutory appeal of an order granting possession of 
property being acquired by direct condemnation. 
3. Neither The Administrative Order Of Condemnation Or The Complaint 
Proposes Condemnation Of Any Property For Sylvan Road. 
Grathol admits that the Complaint filed by ITD does not condemn any property for 
Sylvan Road. "[T]he complaint and description of the property and rights to be acquired 
contained in the Complaint contain no mention of the Sylvan Road extension." Appellant Br., at 
31. Grathol's only support for its claim that property is being condemned for Sylvan Road is a 
reference to Sylvan Road in Paragraph 4(e) of the administrative order of condemnation. 
Paragraph 4 of the administrative order of condemnation does not address or identify the 
land to be taken for the Project. That is addressed in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the order. Rather, 
Paragraph 4 discusses "rights of access" that Grathol may be entitled to following construction of 
the US-95 Project. Although reference is made to Sylvan Road in Paragraph 4(e), Paragraph 
4( e) does not make any provision for the condemnation of any land for that purpose and does not 
identify what land would be condemned for that purpose. R. 17, ~ 4(e). Paragraph 4(e) simply 
reflects the offer that ITD made to Grathol that ITD would construct Sylvan Road if Grathol 
dedicated the land for it. Grathol rejected that offer. See R. at 158-160 (Minzghor Aff.). 
Accordingly, none of the construction plans call for construction of Sylvan Road or identify or 
define any land to be acquired for Sylvan Road. Tr. at 33:12-34:1. No land owned by Grathol 
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has been surveyed and identified for acquisition for Sylvan Road in either the administrative 
order or the Complaint. 
4. The Condemned Property Identified In the Administrative Order Of 
Condemnation Is Identical To The Condemned Property In The Complaint. 
The administrative order of condemnation identifies and defines the property to be 
condemned by reference to the Project construction plan sheets. See R. at 16, ~~ 2,3. The plan 
sheets were then attached to the Complaint filed by the Idaho Transportation Board to identify 
and define the property condemned from Grathol. R. at 5, ~ 18; 11-15. Thus, the property 
identified in the administrative order of condemnation is identical to the condemned property 
described in the Complaint. Compare R. at 5, ~ 18; 11-15 (CompI., at ~ 18 and Ex. B 
(construction plan sheets)) with R. at 16, ~~ 2,3 (admin. ord. of condemn., referencing the 
construction plan sheets). No change occurred in the construction plan sheets from the date the 
administrative order was signed on November 17,2010 (R. at 18), to when the Complaint was 
filed two days later on November 19, 2010. R. at 1. 
5. In The Event Of A Conflict, The Complaint Controls Over The 
Administrative Order Of Condemnation. 
lTD does not exercise its power of eminent domain until it files a condemnation suit. 
For that reason, the complaint takes precedence over the administrative order of condemnation 
in determining what property is being condemned. Here, the property identified in the 
administrative order of condemnation is identical to the property identified in the Complaint, and 
no conflict exists. See Section IV(C)(4) supra. 
In its brief on appeal, Grathol contends that pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-707(6), the 
administrative order of condemnation and description of property being acquired "binds the 
condemning entity to the plans attached to the Complaint." Appellant Br., at 30-31. Grathol 
goes on to state that "[t]his is of a huge significance to a condemnee since a condemnor cannot 
then arbitrarily change the scope of the 'take' in the middle of the lawsuit to gain advantage." !d. 
at 31. 
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lTD has not made any claim or argument that it is not bound "to the construction plans 
attached to the Complaint." In fact, the construction plans referenced in the administrative order 
of condemnation and attached to the Complaint are one and the same. lTD has not changed the 
scope ofthe "take" at any time since the construction plans and the right-of-way acquisitions for 
the US-95 Project were approved by the Idaho Transportation Board. 
Grathol acknowledges and contends that lTD is bound by the "plans attached to the 
Complaint." The plans do not identify or define any taking of property for Sylvan Road. No 
changes in the plans were made between when the administrative order of condemnation was 
signed on November 17,2010 and when the Complaint with the plans attached was filed two 
days later on November 19,2010. 
Despite these admissions, Grathol wrongly contends that Paragraph 4(e) indicates an 
intent to condemn land for Sylvan Road. In the event of a conflict, which does not exist here, the 
holding in Winder makes clear that the complaint, not the administrative order of condemnation, 
defines the scope of the taking. 148 Idaho at 727, 228 P.3d at 994 ("the complaint defines the 
nature and scope ofthe take"). See also Ada County Highway District v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888, 
891-893,26 P.3d 1225, 1228-30 (Ct. App. 2001) (same). 
Nothing in § 7-707, including the 2006 addition of paragraph (6) (requiring the 
administrative order of condemnation to be attached to the complaint), overrides the holdings in 
Winder and Sharp. The legislature is presumed to have known the law when it added the 
requirement that a copy ofthe administrative order of condemnation be attached to the 
complaint. "Courts must construe statutes 'under the assumption that the legislature knew of all 
legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was passed. '" Twin Lakes 
Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214,219,254 P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011) (quoting City of 
Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150,879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994)). 
Thus, the legislature is presumed to know that Idaho courts deem the complaint in a 
condemnation case to control over the administrative order of condemnation in determining the 
scope of the taking. 
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The legislature clearly chose not to alter the precedents of the courts when it did not 
include anything in the amendment that changes or overturns the rule established in Winder and 
Sharp. Moreover, legislative intent to overturn established legal principles must be express and 
plainly apparent. 
The legislature is presumed not to intend to overturn long established principles 
oflaw unless an intention to do so plainly appears by express declaration or the 
language employed admits of no other reasonable construction. 
George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990) 
(citing Doolittle v. Morley, 77 Idaho 366, 372, 292 P.2d 476, 481 (1956)). 
Nothing in the express language of § 7-707(6) or the legislative history ofthe amendment 
adding paragraph (6) gives any indication of an intent to overturn Winder and Sharp. Nor does 
the language employed admit of no other reasonable construction. On the contrary, the 
complaint is the document that the legislature has required to contain a description "of each piece 
ofland sought to be taken" I.C. § 7-707(5). The later requirement that the administrative order 
of condemnation be attached to the complaint only adds to the complaint - which is the 
controlling document under Winder and Sharp. Moreover, § 7-707(6) is limited to identifying 
the property "rights" to be acquired, whereas § 7-707(5) deals with identifying the land to be 
taken. Thus, if there were a conflict, the Complaint and § 7-707(5) would control for purposes of 
deciding what land is being taken in this case. 
6. Grathol's Motive For Seeking Condemnation For Sylvan Road Is To Force 
lTD To Condemn Land and Avoid Paying Its Development Costs. 
According to Grathol, "Defendant is an entity versed in the development and construction 
of commercial retail projects for profit. Defendant acquired the subject property, accomplished a 
zone change and has been actively engaged in pursuit of a development plan for the property." 
R. at 91. In Idaho, cities and counties require internal roads within commercial and residential 
developments to be constructed by the developer and dedicated to the city or county with the 
dedication of the plat of the development. See I.C. § 50-1309 (requiring owners of new 
deVelopments to "make a dedication of all public streets and rights-of-way shown on said plat"). 
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As discussed in detail above, Kootenai County planning and zoning ordinances requires every 
commercial lot to have direct access to a public street. Those streets must be constructed by the 
developer and then dedicated to the county highway district. See Section IIl(J) above and 
Kootenai County ordinances cited therein. 
Therefore, Grathol's motive in trying to force lTD to condemn land for Sylvan Road is 
obvious. Under Kootenai County's ordinances governing commercial development, Grathol will 
be required to construct the road at its expense and dedicate the road and the land to the local 
highway district as a condition of approval for commercial development of its property. Id. By 
making the claim regarding Sylvan Road in this case, Grathol is trying to foist the costs of a 
commercial development onto the public that should rightfully and legally be borne by Grathol, 
the commercial developer. Regardless of its motive, Grathol cannot force lTD to condemn 
property for a local street or property that ITD does not need for a state highway project. 
7. Grathol Does Not Dispute That lTD Negotiated In Good Faith For The 
Purchase Of The Condemned Property. 
Grathol has not made any argument that ITD did not negotiate in good faith to purchase 
the property that both sides agree is being condemned in this case. "Grathol does not argue that 
lTD did not negotiate in good faith to purchase the property described in the Complaint." R. at 
142. Rather, Grathol's argument regarding good faith negotiations is limited to its claim that 
lTD did not negotiate for the purchase of property for Sylvan Road. "[T]hc argumcnt is ovcr thc 
Board's failure to include any consideration or offer for the proposed extension of Sylvan Road." 
Appellant Br., at 34. 
The details of lTD's good faith negotiations for the purchase of the condemned property 
described in the Complaint are set forth in the record. See at R. 66-73; Tr. at 35-38. Based on 
these facts, the district court concluded that ITD had negotiated in good faith to purchase the 
condemned property. R. at 305, ~ 6. 
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D. Grathol's Appeal Should Be Dismissed Because No Legal Basis Exists For This 
Interlocutory Appeal. 
This appeal should be dismissed for the reasons stated in ITD's Memorandum In Support 
Of Motion To Dismiss Appeal filed March 22,2011. Neither Idaho Code § 7-721 or Rule 54(b) 
provides a basis for an interlocutory appeal of the issues raised in this appeal. 
E. lTD Should Be Awarded Its Attorney Fees And Costs On Appeal. 
Before the district court, Grathol represented that it sought a Rule 54(b) certificate in 
order to appeal the four requirements for possession under Idaho Code § 7-721. Despite clear 
statutory authority limiting the issues that may be pursued by interlocutory appeal to four 
specific issues, Grathol filed a Notice of Appeal stating issues that are not subject to 
interlocutory appeal. Grathol has no right of interlocutory ~ppeal of these issues - under Idaho 
Code § 7-721 or otherwise. In short, Grathol' s appeal is barred by the very statute on which it is 
purportedly based. Grathol also failed to seek or obtain permissive appeal under LA.R. 12. 
Under these circumstances, ITD should be awarded its attorney fees and costs on appeal 
under Idaho Code § 12-121. See, e.g., Heiss v. Conti, 148 Idaho 432, 441, 224 P.3d 499,508 
(2009) (awarding attorney fees on appeal under § 12-121 where appeal had no merit and would 
have required the Court to disregard existing statutes) (citing Allbright v. Allbright, 147 Idaho 
752, 756, 215 P.3d 472,476 (2009) ("Attorney fees can be awarded to the prevailing party on 
appeal under that statute only ifthe appeal was brought or defended friyolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation."». Grathol's appeal was brought both unreasonably and without foundation, 
both procedurally and substantively. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
Grathol's interlocutory appeal of the district court's order granting possession of the 
condemned property before trial should be denied. The Idaho Transportation Board filed this 
condemnation suit and is the only entity that has exercised the power of eminent domain. The 
Board approved the US-95 Project and the condemnation of a portion of the Grathol property. 
At the time an administrative order of condemnation became necessary, the Board had approved 
the Project and the condemnation, and the Director of lTD had both statutory and administrative 
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authority to authorize and execute the administrative order of condemnation. The Director did 
not exercise the power of eminent domain. He did not file the complaint, and did not seek to 
condemn property in his name or for his use. 
The property identified in the administrative order of condemnation is identical to the 
property condemned two days later in ITD's Complaint. The uncontroverted facts show that 
lTD is not condemning any property other than the property identified in the Complaint needed 
for construction of the US-95 Project, and is not condemning any property for Sylvan Road. The 
district court's rulings are amply supported in the law and by the facts in this case, and should be 
upheld on appeal. 
DATED this 4th day of November, 2011. 
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KOOTENAI COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE NO. 401 
CASE NO. OA-133-06 (Ordinance Text Amendments) 
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SECTIONS: 
CHAPTER 9 
COMMERCIAL ZONE (C) 
9-9-1 GENERAL COMMERCIAL ZONE DEFINED 
9-9-2 9.01 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
9-9-3 9.02 SITE AREAS 
9-9-4 9.03 USES PERMITTED 
9-9-5 9.04 FRONT, SIDE, AND REAR YARDS 
9-9-6 9.05 USES PERMITTED - STORAGE 
9-9-7 9.06 USES PROHIBITED 
9-9-8 9.07 CONDITIONAL USES 
9-9-9 9.08 RECREATIONAL VEHICLE PARK PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
9-9-109.09 SPECIAL NOTICE PERMITS 
9-9-1: GENERAL COMMERCIAL ZONE DEFINED: The "General Commercial zone" is a land use 
classification for a district suitable for wholesale and retail sales and services. 
9-9-2: PERFORMANCE STANDARDS: In the Commercial zone, no building or premises shall be used, nor any 
building or structure be hereafter erected or altered, unless otherwise provided in this title, except for one (1) or 
more of the following uses in accordance with the following standards. A Commercial lot shall have direct access 
from a public road. 
All uses shall meet the following standards: 
A. Requirements of Chapter 17 of this title, Design Standards 
B. Requirements of Chapter 19 of this title, Supplementary Regulations 
C. Anticipated traffic impacts will be determined for all commercial uses using the most current edition of the 
"Trip Generation Manual." A Special Notice Permit shall be required for commercial uses or buildings that 
are anticipated to generate traffic impacts in excess of the following thresholds: 
1. For sites which access directly onto a State or Federal Highway- 25 cars per hour, or 250 vehicles per 
day. 
2. For sites which access onto other public roads - 50 cars per day. 
D. Uses on all lots or parcels in the Commercial zone which front on a state or federal highway shall require a 
Special Notice Permit. 
E. Requirements ofthe applicable Highway District and Idaho Transportation Department or if the site is within 
an area of city impact, the city's standards for access, approaches, and street design, whichever is the higher 
standard. 
F. If an existing community water system within 1,000 feet ofthe site is willing and able to provide water service 
to the use, connection to that system shall be required. 
G. Requirements of the Panhandle Health District for sanitary sewage disposal. 
H. Requirements of the Panhandle Health District's Critical Materials Regulation. 
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KOOTENAI COUNTY SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE NO. 394 
CASE NO. OA-130-06 (Subdivision Ordinance Text Amendments) 
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An Ordinance in and for the unincorporated areas of Kootenai County, Idaho, amending the following 
sections of Kootenai County Ordinance Number 344: to clarify definitions of common driveway, gated 
community and Wetland Specialist, 1.06 (B) Exemptions, 2.01 (A) Application Requirements- Preliminary 
Subdivision Approval, 2.01 (B) Application Requirements- Final Subdivision Approval, Table 2-1, 2.01 (C) 
Approval Process and Requirements, 2.02 Minor Subdivisions, 2.01 (B) Approval Process and 
Requirements, 3.01 (B) Levels of Utilities and Services, 3.01 (E) Subdivision and Lot Design, 3.01 (E) 
Roads and Trails, 4.01 Bonus Densities, 4.04 Conservation Design Procedure, 4.05 Additional Requirements 
for Conservation Design Subdivisions, and renumbering sections and making stylistic changes in language 
for purposes of codification; adding Appendix E, Natural Resources Report and Map- Requirements for 
Bonus Densities with Conservation Design Subdivisions; establishing subdivision regulations; providing 
purposes, definitions, and applicability; application requirements and approval procedures; design, 
improvement and maintenance requirements; standards for Conservation Design Subdivisions; 
administration and enforcement procedures; Appendices; repealing conflicting Ordinances; providing for 
severability; providing an effective date. 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO: 
SECTION 1. That former Titles lOA and lOB, Kootenai County Code, be, and the same are hereby 
combined as Title 10, Kootenai County Code, the provisions of which shall read as set forth in this 
Ordinance. 
SECTION 2. That Kootenai County Ordinance No. 344, adopted on December 29,2004, be, and the same 
is hereby designated as Title 10, Kootenai County Code, and is hereby amended to read as follows: 
Section 10-1-1 Title 
Section 10-1-2 Authority 
Section 10-1-3 Purpose 
Section 10-1-4 Definitions 
Section 10-1-5 Acronyms 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Section 10-1-6 Applicability and Exemptions 
10-1-1: TITLE: 
This Title shall be known as the Subdivision Ordinance of Kootenai County, Idaho. 
10-1-2: AUTHORITY: 
These regulations are authorized by Title 31, Chapter 7, Title 50, Chapter 13, and Title 67, Chapter 65 of 
Idaho Code; and Article 12, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, as amended or subsequently codified. 
10-1-3: PURPOSE: 
The purpose of this Title is to promote and protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the public and 
to: 
• Ensure that development is in conformance with Idaho Code, with the goals and policies of the 
Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan, with the requirements of County ordinances, and with the 
requirements of other agencies. 
• Provide for orderly development of land. 
• Ensure that development mitigates negative environmental, social and economic impacts. 
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• Create buildable lots of reasonable utility and livability. 
• Preserve, protect and enhance ground and surface water quality. 
• Establish a transportation system for vehicles, bicycles and pedestrians that is safe, efficient, and cost 
effective and that minimizes congestion. 
• Provide for adequate and affordable fire, water, sewer, stormwater and other services. 
• Encourage the conservation of open space and environmentally sensitive areas. 
• Provide for the administration of these regulations. 
10-1-4: DEFINITIONS: 
Words used in the present tense include the future tense. Words used in singular number include the plural, 
and vice versa. The word "shall" and "must" are mandatory, and the word "may" indicates the use of 
discretion. Unless clearly stated otherwise, the following words and phrases shall have the following 
meanings: 
Affected Person - One having an interest in real property that may be affected by a decision. 
Agent - One who acts for or in the place of another. 
Agency - Any city or political subdivision of the State, including but not limited to counties, school districts, 
highway districts, any agency of State government, and any city or political subdivision of another state. 
Amended Plat - A plat that has minor corrections or modifications. 
Approach - An access point onto a public or private road. 
Best Management Practices (BMP's) - Land management practices, approved by the State of Idaho or 
other Idaho public agency, designed to minimize the discharge of sediment and other pollutants. These 
include, but are not limited to, the Idaho Forest Practices Rules, the Rules Governing Solid Waste 
Management, the Rules for Individual and Subsurface Sewage Disposal Systems, the Rules and Minimum 
Standards for Stream Channel Alterations, the Rathdrum Prairie sewage disposal and critical materials 
regulations, the Rules Governing Exploration and Surface Mining Operations in Idaho, the Idaho Well 
Construction Standards Rules, the Rules Governing Placer and Dredge Mining in Idaho, the Rules 
Governing Dairy Wastes, Best Management Practices for Containing Critical Materials During Above 
Ground Storage and Handling, and the Catalog of Storm Water Best Management Practices for Idaho Cities 
and Counties. 
Board - The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. 
Building Envelope - A designated area, shown on a plat, within which all structures must be located. 
Conservation Design Subdivision - A subdivision design that maximizes the conservation of open space 
and the natural, cultural or historic characteristics of an area. The subdivision name for a conservation 
design subdivision will be followed by the suffix "CDS". 
Conservation Easement - A non-possessory interest of a holder in real property, imposing limitations or 
affirmative obligations for retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open space values of real property; for 
assuring its availability for agriculture, forest, recreation or open space use; for maintaining or enhancing air 
or water quality; or for preserving the historical, architectural, archeological or cultural aspects of real 
property (Idaho Code §55-2101). 
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B. Approval Requirements 
The Director may grant the extension providing: a) a complete application was submitted, b) the 
project is in compliance with the requirements of the County and other agencies (those that were in 
place at the time a complete preliminary application was received by the Department), and c) the 
project is in compliance with its conditions of approval. Unless otherwise approved by the applicant, 
the Director shall make a decision within five (5) weeks of the receipt of a complete application. The 
Director's decision may be appealed in accordance with Section 10-5-2 of this Title. 
10-2-6: CONDITION MODIFICATION: 
At any time prior to expiration of subdivision approval, a modification of a condition of approval may be 
requested according to the following procedure: 
A. Application Requirements. The following items constitute a complete application: 
I. Application Form. 
2. Fees as adopted by Board resolution. 
3. A Narrative explaining why a condition modification is necessary. 
4. As part of a complete application, the Director may require additional information to determine 
compliance with County ordinances, or the requirements of other agencies. 
B. Approval Process and Requirements 
For Major Subdivisions, the approval process and required findings are the same as that for 
preliminary approval of the subdivision, as presented in Section 10-2-1(C)(1). 
For Minor Subdivisions the approval process and required findings are the same as the original 
approval process, presented in Section 1O-2-2(B). 
CHAPTER 3 
DESIGN, IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS 
Section 10-3-1 Design Requirements 
A. General Requirements 
B. Levels of Utilities and Services 
C. Utility and Service Standards 
D. Easements and Rights-of-Way 
E. Subdivision and Lot Design 
F. Roads and Trails 
G. Sensitive Area Requirements 
Section 10-3-2 Improvement Requirements 
A. Installation of Improvements 
B. Plan Approval and Site Disturbance Permit 
Section 10-3-3 Maintenance Requirements 
A. Maintenance Required 
B. County Authority to Maintain Private Systems 
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Section 10-3-4 Financial Guarantees 
A. Financial Guarantee in Lieu of Improvements 
B. Warranty 
C. Subdivision Completion and Warranty Agreements 
D. Types of Financial Guarantees 
E. Failure to Complete Improvements 
F. Release of Financial Guarantee 
10-3-1: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS: This section delineates the minimum, on site design requirements for 
both major and minor subdivisions. While off site improvements may also be required to mitigate the effects 
of the development, these will be considered project by project. 
A. General Requirements 
1. Land Suitability. No land shall be subdivided which the Board finds to be unsuitable for building 
sites because of potential hazards, such as flooding, inadequate drainage, severe erosion 
potential, site contamination, excessive slope, rock fall, landslides, subsidence (sinking or 
settling), high ground water, inadequate water supply or sewage disposal capabilities, high 
voltage power lines, high pressure gas lines, poor air quality, vehicular traffic hazards, or any 
other situation that may be detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of residents or the public, 
unless the hazards are eliminated or adequately mitigated. 
2. Within the Kootenai County Airport Overlay Zone, the proposal must be in conformance with 
the Airport Master Plan and the plat must include an A vigation Easement approved by the 
Airport Director. 
3. For lots that will not be used for habitable structures, such as open space, unmanned utility lots 
and dock lots, the Board may waive the requirements for some services and facilities listed in 
Chapter 3, providing the public, agencies, infrastructure, and future lot owners will not be 
negatively affected. 
B. Levels of Utilities and Services 
Development of land shall occur in conjunction with services and facilities that are appropriate for the 
size and density of the development, with urban services being provided for urban size lots. Services 
and facilities necessary to serve the subdivision must be feasible, available and adequate, and the 
proposal must include on and off site improvements to mitigate the impacts of the development so that 
the existing quality of services is not compromised, and so there is no substantial increase in the cost of 
services to existing residents. If authorized by law, mitigation may include payments and fees, 
donation of land, or off site improvements. Required improvements shall be directly related to the 
subdivision under consideration, shall be located in the vicinity of the subdivision, and shall be 
commensurate with anticipated impacts. 
The following are minimum requirements. Other services and facilities may be required on a project 
by project basis. 
1. For lots less than one (1.00) acres, the following services are required: 
a. A sewage disposal system meeting the requirements of Panhandle Health District or DEQ. 
b. A shared water system that can provide fire flows or water storage, if required by the Fire 
District. Shared water systems may require DEQ approval. The Director may waive the 
shared water system requirement if the constraints of the site warrants a modification to 
the requirement. 
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c. Electrical service to each lot. 
d. Fire protection from a Fire District. 
e. Road access to each new lot meeting the standards of Section 10-3-1 (F) of this Title. 
f. For subdivisions with thirty (30) or more lots, garbage collection after the construction of 
fifteen (15) homes. 
2. For lots between one (1.00) and 4.99 acres, the following services are required: 
a. A sewage disposal system meeting the requirements of Panhandle Health District or DEQ. 
b. Reasonable assurance of an adequate and reliable water source for each lot. 
c. Electrical service to each lot. 
d. Fire protection from a Fire District. 
e. Road access to each new lot meeting the standards of Section 10-3-1 (F) of this Title. 
f. For subdivisions with thirty (30) or more lots, garbage collection after construction of 
fifteen (15) homes. 
3. For lots of 5.00 acres or more, the following services are required: 
a. A sewage disposal system meeting the requirements of Panhandle Health District or DEQ. 
b. Reasonable assurance of an adequate and reliable water source. 
c. Fire protection from a Fire District. 
d. Road access to each new lot meeting the standards of Section 10-3-1 (F) of this Title. 
e. For subdivisions with thirty (30) or more lots, garbage collection after construction of 
fifteen (15) homes. 
4. The following services are required for subdivisions in Commercial, Light Industrial and 
Industrial Zones: 
a. Adequate infrastructure for the proposed use, including treatment of non-domestic 
wastewater in a wastewater treatment plant approved by DEQ. No subsurface discharge of 
non-domestic wastewater is permitted. 
b. A water system that meets the State requirements for a public water system and can 
provide fire flows, as required by the Fire District. 
c. Electrical service to each lot. 
d. Fire protection from a Fire District. 
e. Publicly maintained road access to each lot, as approved by the Highway District. 
f. Garbage collection. 
Note: For lots equal to or greater than 5.00 acres, the size of the lot may be figured using gross 
acreage (including 12 of adjoining rights-of-way). All other lot sizes are based on net density, being 
the amount of land per dwelling unit excluding the area for roads, parks, common open space, utility 
facilities, and any other nonresidential use. 
C. Utility and Service Standards 
1. Domestic Water Systems. 
a. When a water district or utility regulated under Idaho Code Title 61 (Public Utility 
Regulation) provides a "will serve" letter for a subdivision, annexation and/or connection 
may be required. If not required, for shared water systems serving 10 or more lots, the 
applicant shall form a water district or utility corporation (non-profit or for profit) to own, 
operate and maintain the system. Water districts and utility corporations must be 
established in conformance with applicable law, and cooperative corporations such as 
homeowners associations must also meet the requirements of Section 10-3-3 and 
Appendix B of this Title. 
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b. The new components of a water system and any necessary improvements to an existing 
system, must be designed and constructed in conformance with the requirements of the 
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, the Idaho Division of Public Works, Idaho 
Standards for Public Works Construction, the fire district, and if applicable, the water 
district, utility or corporation. Distribution lines shall be installed to each lot. 
2. Fire Protection Systems 
Subdivisions shall meet the requirements of the Fire District, including those pertaining to roads, 
driveways, fire flows, hydrants, water storage and defensible space. In addition, each lot shall 
have a building site capable of being accessed by a driveway meeting the minimum standards of 
the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance or the Fire District. 
Subdivisions shall also minimize the hazards associated with wildfire, and major subdivisions in 
timbered areas shall provide a Fire Mitigation Plan, developed by a professional forester, that 
meets the requirements of Appendix A and is approved by the Director, the Fire District, or the 
Idaho Department of Lands. The Plan must be implemented as part of the required 
improvements for the subdivision. 
3. Sewage Disposal Systems. If a public sewage system is available and provides a "will serve" 
letter, connection shall be required. If a private, shared sewage system is available and provides 
a "will serve" letter, connection may be required, providing the cost of service is commensurate 
with that charged to existing customers. If connection to a shared system is required, collection 
lines shall be installed to each lot. All sewage disposal systems shall meet the standards of the 
Panhandle Health District and/or DEQ. If required, shared sewage systems shall be installed and 
approved, or the necessary improvements secured by a financial guarantee, prior to final 
approval of the subdivision. Individual septic systems may be installed after final subdivision 
approval, in conjunction with building permits. 
4. Underground Utility Placement. Unless utility providers determine that site conditions preclude 
underground utility installation, all utilities shall be installed underground. 
5. Stormwater Management. Lots shall be laid out to provide drainage away from building sites. 
Stormwater management and erosion control shall meet the requirements of the Kootenai County 
Site Disturbance Ordinance in accordance with best management practices approved by the 
County. Infiltration of storm water in small quantities is preferred. The collection and 
concentration of storm water in detention and retention basins, wet ponds, constructed wetlands 
or similar facilities is discouraged and shall only be allowed when there is no feasible alternative. 
The installation of curbing is also discouraged because it concentrates runoff. Discharge of 
untreated storm water into streams, lakes, natural wetlands or groundwater is prohibited. 
6. Under Road Utilities. Whenever a utility is proposed to be installed under a road, the utility's 
location and construction shall meet the requirements of the Highway District, ITO or the road 
owner(s). In all instances, placement of utilities shall be coordinated with proposed road 
improvements and shall be installed before the road is completed. 
D. Easements and Rights-of-Way 
1. Utility Easements. A minimum ten (10) foot general utility easement shall be provided to each 
lot. Any shared components of sewage, water, stormwater or other infrastructure systems, shall 
either be within the general utility easement or an easement dedicated or conveyed to the entity 
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responsible for maintenance. Easements must also be provided for individual sewage lines and 
drainfields that will not be located on the same parcel as residences. 
2. Road rights-of-way shall meet the requirements of the Highway District or, if applicable, ITO. 
Common driveway easements shall be at least 40 feet in width. Cut and fill slopes and 
stormwater systems adjacent to roads and driveways must either be shown as easements or 
rights-of-way, in favor of the maintenance entity. When future access may be needed to adjacent 
parcels of land, road easements and rights-of-way shall extend to the property line of the 
subdivision. Except for gated communities and common driveways approved by the Board, 
roads and associated rights-of-way shall be dedicated to the applicable highway agency. Private 
roads and common driveways shall be dedicated to the maintenance entity. 
3. Public trail easements or rights-of-way may be required, depending on the location of the 
subdivision and the need for pedestrian trails and/or sidewalks. If required, they shall be 
dedicated or conveyed to Kootenai County or to the entity that will provide maintenance as 
approved by the Board. The width of trail easements and rights-of-way shall be adequate for the 
intended use, and shall meet the requirements of the County or maintenance entity. When future 
access may be needed to adjacent parcels of land, trail easements and rights-of-way shall extend 
to the property line of the subdivision. 
4. Public Access, Parks and Facilities. Public access easements or the conveyance of land for 
public access, parks or facilities may be required for subdivisions that are contiguous to: a) 
public lands, b) streams, lakes, ponds, wetlands or similar areas, or c) for areas designated in a 
County facilities acquisition plan. If so required, the property owner shall be paid fair market 
value for the easement or land. 
5. The Board or Director may require that Hydrologic Protection Areas be shown as easements or 
rights-of-way. 
6. Required easements and rights-of-way shall be depicted on the face of the plat. 
E. Subdivision and Lot Design 
1. Subdivisions shall be designed to be compatible with eXlstmg homes, businesses and 
neighborhoods, and with the natural characteristics of the area. Subdivisions shall minimize 
grading, road construction and disturbance of the terrain, vegetation, soils, and drainageways, 
and shall prevent soil erosion. To achieve this, the Board may require building envelopes, No-
disturbance Zones, height restrictions and planting or retention of vegetation. 
2. Lot Design. Subdivisions shall result in lots of reasonable utility and livability. Irregular 
configurations that result in unusable land, or that may cause future land use conflicts, are 
prohibited. All building lots must have at least one building site that can meet required setbacks 
and be accessed with a driveway meeting the standards of the Zoning Ordinance or Fire District. 
3. Lot Access. All new lots shall have frontage and direct access onto a road or common driveway 
meeting the standards of Section 10-3-1 (F) of this Title. A lot with an existing residence shall 
not be considered a new lot. For irregularly shaped subdivisions, or sites with severe physical 
constraints, the Board may allow access to individual lots via an easement. Driveway 
approaches to public roads must be approved by the Highway District or ITO. No new accesses 
to individual lots are permitted from State Highways or arterial roads as shown on the highway 
district's current Functional Classification Map. In some cases ITO or the highway district may 
require relocation, reconfiguration, consolidation or elimination of existing approaches. 





ORDER OF CONDEMNATION 
BY:~~-
DEFENDANT'S I EXHIBIT 
plU)JEC'l' NO.: F-2390 (104) PARCEL NO.: 41 J~!5JG 
IJIGBWAY: u.s. Highway No. 93 KEY NO.: 5137 
r,OCA~ION: Twin Falls PARCl!':LID.NO: 0041481 
]{ECORDOWNEJt(S): CANYON VTS'fA F'7\MILY LIMn'!::!) PARTNERSHIP, an Tdaho T,imited Partnership 
rw~ Fa~ls, IDAHO 
C()Ulor.rt: Twin Fa~l s 
The Board, having considered the report and recommendations of the 
State Highway Administrator and having duly considered: the matter, 
finds: 
1. That the above designated project is for the purpose of 
constructing a section ot the State Highway System in the 
location as noted above. 
2. That the right of way necessary for the proposed project 
consists in part of certain real property located in the 
county as noted above, and which property has been deSignated 
and shown as the above parcel number on the plans of said 
project now on file i.n the office of the Idaho Transportation 
Department. 
3. That the parcel so designated and shown on said project plans 
"is necessary to the construction of said project, and the 
construction of said project is impossible without the 
acquisition of said parcel. 
4. That all rights of access to, from, and between the right of 
way of the public way and all of the contiguous remaining 
real property of the record owner(s} shall be extinguished and 
prohibited except for access, if any, as provided and shown on 
the said project plans referred to in Paragraph 2 above. 
5. That the record owner(s), according to a Preliminary Title 
Report now on file in the office of the Idaho Transportation 
Department, of the parcel so designated and shown on said 
project plans are as listed above. Any encumbrances or liens 
of record pertinent to the parcel so designated are as set 
forth io said title report. Any other known claimants to the 
property as determined by investigations of representatives of 
this Department are as set torth above. 





its representatives, sought in good faith to arrive at a 
settlement with the above-mentioned record owner(s), as to the 
value of land (including the improvements thereon) represented 
by ·the aforementioned parcel, together with any easements 
necessary for the construction and relocation of irrigation 
and drainage facilities, approaches, access roads~ rounding of 
slopes, etc., in connection with the construction of the 
project, and the damages which will result to the property not 
taken and has been unable to make any reasonable bargain 
therefore, or settlement of such damages. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the acquisition of the lands 
and property rights hereinabo~e described is necessary to the 
construction and ,maintenance of the said highway project. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Idaho Transportation Department shall 
acquire the .. hereinabove designated'real property and 'property rights 
through the power of eminent domain. 







David S. Ekern; Director, 
On Behalf of The 
Idaho Transportation Board 
S retary 
